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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Richard Healey was injured when he fell through 
an opening in the floor of a construction project in Orem, Utah. 
Healey sued the general contractor of the project, Appellant A.B.P. 
Enterprises, Inc. ("ABP") , the Mechanical sub-contractor, Appellee 
Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (••Clark") and a sub-contractor 
of Clark, Appellee J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. ("JB") in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court (the "District Court"). This appeal 
concerns cross-claims which ABP filed against Clark and JB on the 
issue of indemnity. 
ABP moved for summary judgment for indemnity from Clark 
pursuant to an agreement between ABP and Clark (the "ABP Agreement" 
attached as Ex. B) . ABP also moved for summary judgment against JB 
pursuant to an agreement between Clark and JB (the "Subcontract 
Agreement" attached as Ex. C) . Clark and JB both filed cross 
motions for summary judgment against ABP on the indemnity issues. 
The District Court denied ABP's motions for partial summary 
judgment and granted JB's and Clark's cross-motions. ABP hereby 
appeals to this Court seeking a judgment for indemnity from Clark 
and JB. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
S 78-2-2(3) (g) of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues on appeal and the standards of appellate 
review are as follows: 
1. Whether, given the language and surrounding 
circumstances, the Agreement between ABP and Clark sufficiently 
expresses the intent to indemnify ABP for its own negligence. 
In Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 
1990) the Supreme Court of Utah construed an indemnity agreement 
very similar to the one in this case without deference to the legal 
conclusions of the trial court. As contract construction is an 
issue of law, the proper standard of appellate review of this issue 
is correction of error or "correctness, without according deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions." Bonham v. Morgan, 788 
P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether, given the language and surrounding 
circumstances, the Subcontract Agreement between Clark and JB 
requires JB to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.1 
The standard of appellate review of this issue is also 
correction of error. Bonham, 788 P.2d at 494. 
*The District Court denied A.B.P. 's Motion for Summary Judgment 
for indemnity against J.B. stating that there was no privity of 
contract between A.B.P. and J.B. and that A.B.P. failed to 
establish that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the 
Subcontract Agreement. The District Court also held that A.B.P. 
did not establish that J.B. intended to indemnify A.B.P. for its 
own negligence. (R. 2173 and Exhibit "E".) 
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3. Whether the rule of strict construction of indemnity 
agreements which seek to indemnify a party for its own negligence 
should be relaxed in the commercial contexts. 
As this is an issue of law, the standard of appellate 
review is also correction of error. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes are determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 and § 13-8-1. (The statutes are set out 
in full in Exhibit A.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
ABP seeks review of the District Court's Orders denying 
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for indemnity from Clark 
and JB and from the District Court's Orders granting Clark's and 
JB's cross-motions for summary judgment against ABP on the issue of 
indemnity. ABP sought indemnity from Clark pursuant to the ABP 
Agreement which provides for Clark to indemnity ABP for "any and 
all loss, damage, injury, liability and claims." (R. 1077 and Ex. 
B.) 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Richard Healey sued the Owner and General Contractor, 
ABP, the sub-contractor, Clark and a sub-contractor of Clark, JB in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court for recovery for personal 
injuries which he received while working at a construction site. 
(R.101.) ABP filed a Cross-Claim against Clark and JB for 
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indemnity (R. 1255)• Clark filed a Cross-Claim against JB for 
indemnity. (R. 236.) Healey's claims were settled and dismissed 
with prejudice on August 13, 1993. (R. 2166.) 
The remaining issues in this case are based on ABP's 
claim for indemnity against Clark and JB and Clark's Cross-Claim 
for indemnity from JB. Based upon the indemnity provision in the 
Agreement between ABP and Clark (the "ABP Agreement"), Clark must 
indemnify ABP for all damages for which ABP is liable to Mr. 
Healey. ABP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking indemnity 
against Clark on November 12, 1992. (R. 1053.) On December 21, 
1992, Clark filed a Cross-Motion. (R. 2123.) The District Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision on February 10, 1993, (R. 172 0 and 
Exhibit "G") and in an Order dated March 9, 1993, the District 
Court denied ABP's Motion and granted Clark's Cross-Motion holding 
that the Agreement did not evidence intent to indemnify ABP for its 
own negligence. (R. 2058 and Exhibit "D") 
On November 24, 1992, ABP filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment seeking indemnity from JB based on the Agreement 
between JB and Clark (the "Subcontract Agreement"). On December 
18, 1992, JB filed its Cross-Motion. (R. 1272.) In the Memorandum 
Decision dated February 10, 1993 (R. 1720 and Exhibit "G") and in 
an Order and Judgment dated March 9, 1993 (R. 2058 and Ex. "D"), 
the District Court denied ABP's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
JB. In a Memorandum Decision dated June 21, 1993 (R. 2143 and 
Exhibit "H"), and in an Order and Judgment dated September 13th, 
4 
1993# the District Court granted JB's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment against ABP (R. 2174 and Exhibit MEM) 
On June 16, 1993 Clark moved for summary judgment on its 
cross claim for indemnity from JB (R. 2120) and JB filed a cross 
motion against Clark on June 30th 1993. (R. 2146.) On October 4, 
1993, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision (R. 2176 and 
Exhibit "I") and on October 18, 1993 the District Court signed the 
Order denying Clark's motion for summary judgment against JB and 
granting JB's cross motion. (R. 2180 and Ex. F.) 
On November 8, 1993, ABP filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 
2187) and on November 15, 1993, Clark filed a Notice of Cross 
Appeal. (R. 2191.) 
Statement of Facts 
The action in the District Court was a claim for personal 
injuries resulting from an accident at a construction site in Orem, 
Utah on March 7, 1991. (R. 101.) Richard Healey was seriously 
injured when he fell through an opening in the second floor of the 
building under construction. Healey's Complaint alleges that the 
opening was covered with a section of heating duct and, when Healey 
and a co-worker attempted to move the duct, Healey fell through the 
opening. Healey sued ABP, Clark and JB. (R. 104.) 
According to the Complaint, the opening was cut by JB and 
JB failed to securely cover the opening. (R. 101.) ABP covered 
the opening with the section of heating duct. Healey's First Cause 
of Action alleged that ABP, Clark and JB breached their duty to 
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provide a safe work place. (R. 100.) Healey's Second Cause of 
Action alleged that the three defendants breached duties owed under 
the Utah OSHA Act. (R. 96.) Healey alleged that ABP and Clark 
failed to provide a safe place to work# failed to comply with 
reasonable and prudent safety standards, failed to insure that 
openings in the floor were securely covered, and failed to 
supervise and inspect the work done by the sub-contractors. 
(R. 95-100.) Healey alleged that JB was negligent in failing to 
cover the hole. The District Court did not apportion the fault 
among the parties because Healey's claims were settled. 
On September 17, 1990, ABP and Clark executed the ABP 
Agreement for the work to be done by Clark. The ABP Agreement, 
attached as Exhibit MBM, contained a provision entitled "Safety 
Measures" which provides that Clark shall take "all reasonable 
precautions to protect the work, workmen, and the public; and shall 
provide, where reasonably necessary, barriers, guards, temporary 
bridges, lights and watchmen." (R. 1077.) It also contains 
indemnity and insurance provisions. The first indemnity provision 
is entitled "General Liability" and it provides that "Sub-
Contractor shall indemnify and save General Contractor. . . from 
and against any and all loss, damage, injury, liability and claims 
thereof for injuries to or death of persons. . . resulting directly 
or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this Contract." 
(R. 1077.) 
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The second indemnity provision, entitled "Employee's 
Liability," provides that "Sub-Contractor shall perform the work 
hereunder in conformance with all applicable Federal and State 
labor laws, and shall indemnify and save General Contractor 
harmless from any and all liability, claims, costs and expenses of 
whatsoever nature under such laws arising out of the performance of 
this Contract." (R. 1077.) Finally, the Agreement also contains 
an insurance provision stating that Clark shall maintain workers' 
compensation, property damage and liability insurance. (R. 1077.) 
After Clark executed the ABP Agreement, it signed an 
agreement with JB (the "Subcontract Agreement"), which is attached 
as Exhibit "C". (R. 222.) The Subcontract Agreement defines Clark 
as the "Contractor," JB as the "Subcontractor," and WordPerfect 
Corp. as the "Owner." It provides that the Contractor and 
Subcontractor agree to be bound by the terms of the Prime Contract. 
(R. 222.) The Prime Contract is the ABP Agreement. It also 
provides that "[t]he Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor 
all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor 
assumes toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall indemnify the 
Contractor and Owner against, and save them harmless from, any and 
all loss, damage, expenses, costs and attorney's fees incurred or 
suffered on account of any breach of the provisions or covenants of 
this contract." (R. 221.) Finally, the Subcontract Agreement 
provides that JB "agrees to fully comply with the Occupational 
7 
Safety & Hea" .- 1 
pursuant thereto 
SUMMARY , ARGUMENT 
: _ ,.. Agreemp' * 5 
parties t .-idem:, if » ^ "-e. rne Agreement is 
i i" -] li, li ; - * ' .* i reund v Utah Power & 
Light C o . . ? i . * . e i ? 
Agreement contains r iJ sweeping cro^aqe stating that Clar> shall 
: *"
 u
-
1
 ' 4,^ -.^- =L_ ~ "v liability, 
a m claims - * .,*d AJ :.c . . ; - - *-.-? 
fc id a*, "li^bilit^ e of ' - r- wcr : liability is 
! * ' -~ • * ^~d all ^ Nations ~^ ABP 
bee ..w, ~~... , .. . . . i 
negligence. 
Tli I nit ("'inl l"ii indemnify ABP for its own negligence is 
unmistakable when v lewed in I , 1111 f compara 11 ve t a u J I I i . 
Comparative fault was enacted in Ut.ah approximately Inui years 
1
 ." '.•
 l
 I c M n." ' -ii1 executed. Under comparative fault, 
out i ii in i  11 IK? hi'lfl liabJU I
 iAgence in excess ui unc '" s own 
fault , Therefore, the only loss, damage and liability to which the 
MM A )i e em fiit i I If rofcrrinr * * ™ i q e and liability for 
ABP's own negligence, , limit.i |u. .*.. „ lidLuIiL"! , ill u 11 d 
be logical for ABP to seek indemnity for Clark's negligence tut, 
i f i V M i i i i n Hiiprii i a I i II I in II need 11 I r m n i l i 1 l m t 'he 
n e g l i g e n c e ol o t l i e i s m i l / p r o v i s i o n s in LIIL ABP 
8 
Agreement are meaningless unless interpreted to indemnify ABP for 
its own negligence. 
Although the ABP Agreement indemnifies ABP for its own 
negligence, it does not purport to indemnify ABP for its sole 
negligence. The ABP Agreement does not say or even imply that ABP 
is to be indemnified for sole negligence. Rather, the ABP 
Agreement indemnifies ABP for negligence "resulting" from Clark's 
performance of the contract. As the negligence must result from 
Clark's performance of the contract, it is not possible for ABP to 
be solely negligent. Under Utah law, a contract should be 
construed in a way which will give it legal effect. The ABP 
Agreement does not provide for indemnity for ABP's sole negligence 
and should not be interpreted to do so. 
II. ABP has a cause of action against JB for indemnity 
because ABP is an intended third-party beneficiary of the 
Subcontract Agreement between JB and Clark. The Subcontract 
Agreement specifically provides that JB shall indemnify the "Owner" 
and that Clark and JB agree to be bound by the terms of the Prime 
Contract. The Prime Contract is the ABP Agreement. 
III. This Court has recognized that the trend in the 
country is to relax the strict construction of indemnity 
provisions. The rationale for strict construction was that one 
should not be indemnified for one's own negligence because it may 
encourage carelessness. Given the modern state of business 
arrangements, the abolishment of joint and several liability, and 
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Freund, like this case, involved indemnity provisions 
found in a construction contract.2 Because the indemnity language 
in Freund is very similar to the language in this case, Freund 
precludes judgment against ABP. The Freund indemnity clause 
states: "Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect and save 
harmless Licensor [UP&L] from and against any and all claims, 
demands, causes of action, costs or other liabilities for damages 
to property and injury or death to persons" Id. at 371.3 
(Brackets added by Freund Court.) The General Indemnity provision 
in the ABP Agreement states: " Sub-Contractor shall indemnify and 
save General Contractor, its officers or agents harmless from and 
against any and all loss, damage, iniurv. liability, and claims 
2In Freund, the plaintiff sued UP&L in federal court when he 
was injured by a power line on a utility pole owned by UP&L. UP&L 
and Freund's employer, Jones Intercable, Inc. ("Jones") were bound 
by an indemnity provision. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit certified to the Utah Supreme Court the question 
of whether the indemnity clause was sufficiently clear and 
unequivocal to indemnify UP&L for its own negligence. IcL at 3 64. 
3The entire first sentence of the Freund indemnity provision 
reads: 
Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect and save harmless 
Licensor [UP&L] from and against any and all claims, 
demands, causes of action, costs or other liabilities for 
damages to property and injury or death to persons which 
may arise out of or be connected with the erection, 
maintenance, presence, use or removal of Licensee's 
equipment, or of structures, guys and anchors used, 
installed or placed for the principal purpose of supporting 
Licensee's equipment or by any act of Licensee on or in the 
vicinity of Licensor's poles, including, but not by way of 
limitation, payments made under workmen's compensation 
laws. (Italics added by Freund court.) 
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thereof for injuri es to or deatl 1 of persons ' (Emphasis added >) 
The otl :n s r indemnity provision :i i it t:l: :t E 1 > B I Agreement states: 
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own negligence, the Freund Court relied on til: ie broad language and 
1 I In W N M I " I hiln I itirn.H The Court elated that "the 
broad sweep oi the language employed by the parties clearly covers 
those instances in which the licensor may be negligent. " ,.Id,. at 
' ! II (Empl lasi s adde d) , The :i i idemnj t;;( pro v isi en is ii i tl i 3 ABP 
&gr = :=: .me i it contaii i E .• g ia] ] j br oad lang ua gp ::  Ii it f a c t, tl: ie key 
language i n the ABP Agreement, "ai ij and al 1 loss 3ama :je, i njury, 
1 i abi 1 i t] •' ai id cl a :i us ' (R 1 0 7 3 ) i s virtual ly identical to the key 
*The indemnity pi: o % is I . 
(a) Gei iera.1 1 ;ar. i. ^'-Contractor shall 
indemnify and save General Contractor, its officers or 
agents harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, 
injury, liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or 
death of persons, and all loss or damage to property of 
others, resulting directly or indirectly from Sub-
Contractor 's performance of this contract 
(d) Employer's Liabi lity: Sub-Contractor shall 
perform, the work hereunder in accordance with all 
applicable Federal and State labor laws, and shall 
indemnify and save General Contractor harmless from any and 
all liability, claims, costs, ai id, expenses of whatsoever 
nature under such laws arising out of the performance of 
th i s contract, (Emphasis added.) (R. 1077.) 
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language in Freund; "any and all claims, demands, causes of 
action, costs or other liabilities" Id. 
Of the key language, the Freund Court focused 
specifically on the word "liabilities," which the Court found to be 
"particularly significant since it covers those instances where the 
Licensor is legally liable for damages, including those where 
liability arises because of the Licensor's negligence." Xd. The 
ABP Agreement also indemnifies ABP against "liability" and 
therefore, as in Freund, the ABP Agreement covers those situations 
where ABP is liable, including liability for its own negligence. 
In addition to the broad sweep of the language and the 
use of the word "liability", there is a factor present in this case 
not present in Freund. The ABP Agreement was executed after Utah 
adopted comparative negligence. Since Utah law now shelters ABP 
from any other party's negligence, there is only one possible 
purpose of the ABP Agreement's indemnity clauses — to indemnify 
ABP for its own negligence. 
B. READING THE ABP AGREEMENT IN LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE LAW MAKES IT CLEAR THAT ABP IS INDEMNIFIED FOR 
ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE. 
1. The Only Meaningful Interpretation Is To Indemnify 
ABP For Its Own Negligence. 
In 1986, Utah law was changed and the concept of joint 
and several liability was replaced with comparative negligence. 
Utah Code §78-27-38 provides in part that Mno defendant is liable 
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The indemnity provision was not operative because it 
provided no more protection than that already provided by 
comparative negligence. The ABP Agreement, on the other hand, is 
not directed to the negligence of any other party. The agreement 
was drafted four years after Utah adopted comparative negligence 
and must be read in light of the law existing at the time of 
execution. 
2. Contract Interpretation Case Law Calls For 
Indemnity For ABP's Own Negligence. 
Freund teaches that party intent must be ascertained from 
the circumstances surrounding the agreement. 793 P.2d at 37 0. 
Utah law also holds that all contracts implicitly contain the laws 
existing at the time the contract was executed. See Washington 
National Insurance Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
Freund and Washington National allow this Court to 
evaluate party intent in light of comparative negligence. The ABP 
indemnity provisions, when viewed in light of existing Utah law, 
have only one possible purpose — to indemnity ABP for its own 
negligence. 
3. Courts In Other Jurisdictions Use Similar Analysis 
In Interpreting Indemnity Agreements. 
Courts in other jurisdictions recognize that comparative 
fault means a general contractor is not liable for another party's 
negligence and conclude that the only reason for an indemnity 
clause is to protect the general contractor from the consequences 
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indemnify a party for its own negligence. In Public Service Co. v. 
United Cable Television of Jeffco. Inc.. 829 P.2d 1280 (Colo. 
1992), the Supreme Court of Colorado stated that broad, all-
inclusive language is sufficient to wexpress the parties' intent 
when indemnity contracts are entered into in a commercial context." 
The Public Service Court held that party intent was clearly and 
unambiguously expressed in the indeirinity agreement which provided 
indemnification "from and against all claims, liabilities, causes 
of action, or other legal proceedings." Id. at 1282. (Emphasis 
added.) The Public Service Court noted that the agreement did not 
specifically mention the negligence of the indemnified party. Id. 
at 1283. Public Service, citing Freund. also notes the importance 
of the word "liabilities" because it covered those instances where 
the indemnified party was "legally liable for damages, including 
those where liability arises because of its own negligence." Id. 
at 1283. 
The language in the Public Service case is similar to the 
ABP Agreement. Although there are stylistic differences, both 
agreements contain broad sweeping language and provide for 
indemnity from all "liability". 
Likewise, in Fischbach-Natkin Company v. Power Process 
Piping. Inc., 403 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. App. 1987), the Court of 
Appeals of Michigan found that an agreement between a 
sub-contractor and a general contractor manifested a clear intent 
to indemnify the general contractor for its own negligence. The 
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Fischbach indemnity agreement indemnified the general contractor 
•'from and against all liability or claimed liability." Id. at 570 
(emphasis added). The Fischbach Court held this provision was 
broad enough to encompass all liability for injuries, including 
those caused by the general contractor's own negligence. Jd. at 
572. 
D. THE ABP AGREEMENT INDEMNIFIES ABP FOR THE CONCURRENT 
NEGLIGENCE OF ABP AND CLARK BUT NOT FOR ABP'S SOLE 
NEGLIGENCE. 
One of the issues raised on summary judgment below 
relates to the effect of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1, which prevents 
indemnity agreements from indemnifying for the "sole negligence" of 
any party. (R. 1053.) The District Court did not reach this 
issue, because it concluded that ABP was not entitled to 
indemnification. 
Even though the District Court did not resolve the "sole 
negligence" issue, it is properly before this Court. If this Court 
remands this case for further proceedings, the sole negligence 
issue would become material and dispositive and accordingly, it 
should be addressed on appeal. See Anderson v. Utah County Board 
of County Commissioners. 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 note 2 (Utah 1979). 
1. The ABP Agreement Does Not Purport To Indemnify ABP 
For Sole Negligence. 
Utah Code § 13-8-1 (1992) provides that an agreement 
relative to the construction of a building, is void and 
unenforceable if it indemnifies against liability "caused by or 
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resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee." The ABP 
Agreement is not such an agreement. Although the ABP Agreement 
does not contain a clause specifically excluding indemnity for its 
sole negligence, its language, taken as a whole, precludes that 
result. 
The ABP Agreement states that Clark shall indemnify for 
losses "resulting directly or indirectly from the Sub-Contractor's 
performance of this contract." (R. 1077 and Ex. B.) Because the 
ABP Agreement limits liability to losses associated with Clark's 
contractual obligations, it necessarily excludes coverage in any 
instances where liability could be incurred that was solely the 
fault of ABP. Moreover, it is clear that in the facts currently 
before the Court, ABP was not solely negligent. According to the 
Complaint, plaintiff's injuries were caused by the joint negligence 
of ABP, JB and Clark. (R. 101.) More importantly, in pleadings 
filed in the District Court, JB and Clark both acknowledge ABP was 
not solely negligent.5 
2. The ABP Agreement Should Not Be Interpreted In A 
Way That Renders It Void. 
Under Utah law, contracts are to be construed in a manner 
which will give them legal effect. In Stanal v. Todd, 554 P.2d 
1316, 1319, 1320 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "a 
construction giving an instrument a legal effect to accomplish its 
5JB alleged, and Clark concurred, that the accident was caused, 
in part, by Healey's employer and his co-employees. (R. 328, 347-
48.) 
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purpose will be adopted where reasonable, and between two possible 
constructions that will be adopted which establishes a valid 
contract." As previously noted, all contracts also contain the law 
in existence at the time of the contract's execution. Washington 
795 P.2d at 669. Thus, as a matter of contract law, the ABP 
Agreement contains S 13-5-1 and the indemnity provision should be 
construed in harmony with that statute. 
The indemnity provision's reference to Clark's 
contractual performance is a clear, albeit indirect, limitation on 
liability precluding indemnification for sole negligence. Utah law 
requires this interpretation, to give the contract life. 
3. This Case Is Distinguishable From Jacobsen 
Construction Company v. Blaine. 
In Jacobsen Construction Company v. Blaine. 224 UAR 20 
(Utah 1993) , this Court found that an indemnity agreement was void 
because it purported to indemnify a contractor for its sole 
negligence. The Jacobsen case is distinguishable because it 
contains language not found in the ABP Agreement. The Jacobsen 
agreement contained a distinction between liability for "active" 
negligence and "passive" negligence.6 Although the agreement did 
not recjuire indemnification for sole active negligence, in Jacobsen 
6Jacobson cites the pertinent language as follows: 
"active negligence on the part of the owner or contractor. 
. . and is not caused or contributed to by an omission to 
perform some duty also imposed on the sub-contractor. . . . 
such indemnity shall not apply to such party guilty of such 
active negligence." Id. at 21. 
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this Court, by implication found that sole "passive" negligence 
would be covered — making the agreement violative of public policy 
under § 13-8-1. Because the ABP Agreement does not make this 
distinction, Jacobsen's holding is not applicable. 
XI. JB MUST INDEMNIFY ABP BECAUSE ABP IS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
OF JB'S SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT WITH CLARK. 
The District Court denied ABP's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against JB because it concluded there was no contractual 
privity between ABP and JB. The District Court also concluded that 
ABP had failed to establish that it was a third party beneficiary 
of the Subcontract Agreement between JB and Clark. These holdings 
are not in harmony with Utah law. 
In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court notes that before a third 
party can have enforceable rights under a contract, it must be an 
"intended beneficiary" of the contract. Jd. at 1386. According to 
Blomquist. the intention to create "intended beneficiary" rights 
"is to be determined from the terms of the contract as well as the 
surrounding facts and circumstances." Id. 
In this case, ABP is an intended beneficiary for two 
reasons. First, WordPerfect Corp., which is affiliated with ABP, 
is specifically named in the Subcontract Agreement. Second, the 
Subcontract Agreement specifically references the Prime Contract 
and binds JB to its terms. The Prime Contract is the ABP 
Agreement. 
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The Subcontract Agreement defines Clark as the 
"Contractor", JB as the "Subcontractor" and WordPerfect Corp. as 
the "Owner" (R. 222 and Ex. C) and states: that "[T]he 
Subcontractor [JB] assumes toward the Contractor [Clark] all the 
obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor fClark1 
assumes toward the Owner [WordPerfect]. The Subcontractor shall 
indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save them 
harmless from, any and all loss, damage, expenses, costs and 
attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of 
the provisions or covenants of this contract." (R. 221.) (emphasis 
added•) 
By specifically naming WordPerfect and by binding JB to 
the terms of the ABP Agreement, JB and Clark intended to make ABP 
a third party beneficiary. ABP can therefore enforce the indemnity 
provisions in both the ABP Agreement and the Subcontract Agreement 
against JB. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD RELAX THE RULE OP STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS IN THE COMMERCIAL CONTEXT. 
As this Court has already recognized, the judicial trend 
is to relax the strict construction of indemnity agreements. See 
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah App. 
1989). Neighboring states, including Colorado, have also 
recognized the growing trend in the country to relax the rule of 
strict construction of indemnity contracts. Public Service Co. v. 
United Cable. 829 P. 2d at 1285. The Utah Supreme Court, in Freund, 
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took the first step towards relaxing the strict construction rule 
by allowing the evaluation of indemnity agreements according to the 
objectives of the parties and the surrounding facts and 
circumstances, Freund. 793 P.2d at 370. 
Strict construction no longer serves a purpose. As noted 
by this Court, strict construction was required to discourage 
carelessness which could allow someone to avoid the financial 
consequences of their own negligence. In the modern world, 
liability insurance effectively shifts the financial burden for an 
insured's negligence. Pickhover, 771 P.2d at 667-668. 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Freund, a change to 
Utah law has provided another reason to reconsider strict 
construction. Under Utah's comparative fault statute, indemnity 
agreements are only necessary to indemnify for one's own 
negligence. The dual motivation for indemnity agreements existing 
when Freund was decided, is no longer an issue. Parties seeking 
indemnification do so only to protect against their own negligence. 
In this case, both the ABP Agreement and the Subcontract 
Agreement contain clauses requiring the purchase of insurance. 
Both agreements were negotiated at arms' length by large, corporate 
citizens. The contracts were negotiated and executed four years 
after Utah adopted comparative fault. Strict construction serves 
no purpose in this commercial context. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ABP respectfully requests that 
this Court overrule the District Court's determination that ABP is 
not entitled to indemnity and rule# as a matter of law, that the 
ABP Agreement clearly manifests the party's intent that ABP is to 
be indemnified for its own negligence. The Court should also rule 
that the indemnity provision is not void under Utah Code Ann. § 13-
8-1. 
DATED this ^( day of January, 1994. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Mark M. Bettilyon 
George S. Adondakis 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ABP Enterprises, Inc. 
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13-8-1. Construction industry — Agreements to 
indemnify. 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding 
in, or in connection with or collateral to, a contract or 
agreement relative to the construction, alteration, re-
pair or maintenance of a building, structure, high-
way, appurtenance and appliance, including moving, 
demolition and excavating connected therewith, pur-
porting to indemnify the promisee against liability 
for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or 
damage to property caused by or resulting from the 
sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or em-
ployees, or indemnitee, is against public policy and is 
void and unenforceable. 
This act will not be construed to affect or impair 
the obligations of contracts or agreements, which are 
in existence at the time the act becomes effective. 
1969 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person. He may recover 
from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is lia-
ble to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant. 1986 
A B P D E V E L O P M E N T C O M P A N Y 
CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 11th day of September, 1990, by and 
between ABP Enterprises, Inc., dba ABP Development Company, of Orem, Utah, hereinafter referred 
to as General Contractor, and CLARK MECHANICAL, of Provo, Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
Sub-Contractor. 
A. SPECIAL TERMS: 
1. Job Description: #910, Building K. 
2. The Sub-Contractor shall perform for the General Contractor at or near 1359 N. Res. Way, 
Orem, Utah, the hereinafter described work, and under the conditions and terms contained herein. 
3. Work shall be commenced September 1, 1990, diligently prosecuted, and completed by 
February 1, 1991. 
4. General Contractor shall pay Sub-Conti-actor, in accordance with statements prepared by the 
Sub-Contractor, a compensation of ($ 930,409.00), as specified under 2D (1) and (2). 
B. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
1. PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK 
(a) Specifications and Standards: Sub-
Contractor shall perform the work in accordance with (1) the 
plans and specifications and exhibits, if any, for said job, and 
(2) according tn all standards prescribed by law or by anybody 
having the right to prescribe minimum standards. 
( b ) P e r m i t s : Unless otherwise provided herein, Sub-
Contractor shall, at Sub-Contractor's sole cost and expense, 
secure all necessary permits, make all cash or other deposits, 
furnish all bonds, and give all notices required by law. 
(r) Materials, Equipment, Labor: Unless 
otheiwise provided herein, Sub-Contractor shall furnish all 
material, utilities, supplies, tools, and equipment, and perform 
all labor. 
( d ) S a f e t y M e a s u r e s : Sub-Contractor shall lake all 
reasonable precautions to protect the work, workmen, and the 
public, and shall provide, where reasonably necessary, barriers, 
guards, temporary bridges, lights, and watchmen. 
( e ) Please see attached Exhibit *A" for specifications. 
2. COMPENSATION 
( a ) E x t r a W o r k : Sub-Contractor shall be entitled to 
payment for extra work performed only if such work shall 
have been previously authorized in writing by the General 
Contractor. 
( b ) T a x e s : The compensations p* ovided herein includes 
and Sub-Contractor shall pay all State and Federal payroll 
taxes, including contributions or taxes assessed against 
employees on wages earned, in connection with the work. 
Sub-Contractor agrees to indemnify Genera! Contractor for all 
liability in connections therewith and to make all reports 
required thereunder. The compensation ulso includes an 
amount on account of all other taxes now or hereafter 
imposed by am governmental authority upon, measured hy or 
incident to, th" performance of this contract or the purchase, 
storage, use 01 consumption by the Sub-Contractor of material 
us^d h\ the performance of this contract 
( c ) A c c e p t a n c e Of W o r k : Acceptance shall be on the 
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date the work is completed to the General Contractors 
satisfactions. No payment hereunder shall constitute an 
acceptance of defective work or improper materials. 
(d) Terms of Payment: (l) At the end of each 
calendar month during the progress of the work, and upon 
completion of the entire work, Sub-Contractor shall be entitled 
to receive eighty-five percent (85%) of the compensation 
provided herein for the work performed during that month. 
The balance shall be payable 35 days after acceptance, provided 
there are no undischarged or unsecured liens, attachments, or 
claims in connection with the work. General Contractor may 
require, as a condition to payment, that Sub-Contractor 
submit evidence, by receipted bills or otherwise, that all costs 
incurred for the work have been paid. (2) When payments are 
due as provided above, Sub-Contractor shall prepare 
statements of amounts payable. Such statements shall show 
the total compensation for the work performed to date, less 
any previous payments. 
3- DELAYS 
The time for completion shall be extended for such period 
that the Sub-Contractor is delayed by acts of God or the 
elements, or by other causes beyond Sub-Contractor's 
reasonable control, including civil disorders and labor 
disturbances. 
4.INSPCCTIONtAPPROVAL,CANCELLATION 
( a ) I n s p e c t i o n s : General Contractor shall have the 
right to visit and inspect the work, or any part thereof, at all 
times Sub-Contractor shall keep a competent man in the 
immediate vicinity of the work to receive communications 
from General Contractor and to supervise the work. 
( b ) A p p r o v a l : Gcncrat Contractor may reject 
materials, whether worked or unworked, and all portions of 
the work which appear to be unsound or defective or failing in 
any way to conform with the specifications hereof; Sub-
Contractor shall remove such rejected materials or portions of 
the work from the premises %vithin twenty-four (21) hours 
flftcr receiving notice theteof from Grnei.-tl Contractu!. ]f 
removal of i ejected material* or work should result in dumagc 
to material* furnished by General Conttnctnr, Sub-Contractor 
shall furnish new materials of identical kind and quantity 
without ttist to General Contractor. 
(c ) C a n c e l l a t i o n : (1) Should Sub-Contractor fail, 
refuse, or neglect to supply sufficient material to be supplied 
hy Sub-Contractor hereunder; or tools, labor, or properly 
skilled workmen to complete the work hereunder with 
reasonable diligence and dispatch, for three (3) days after 
written notice of such default to Sub-Contractor, the General 
Contractor may at any time thereafter take over and complete 
the work. The cost to the General Contractu! of completing 
such work shall be deducted from any moneys due Sub-
Contractor. If such cost exceeds any such moneys, Sub-
Contractor shall reimburse the General Contractor. (2) 
Should the Sub-Contractor seek relief under any law for the 
benefit of insolvents, or be adjudged as bankrupt, the General 
Contractor may at any time thereafter terminate this 
agreement and complete the work as provided in Section 4(C)( 
1) hereof, except that any payments due from Sub-Contractor 
to vendors for material supplied for work hereunder may be 
made direct by the General Contractor to such vendors, and be 
deducted from the amounts otherwise due to the Sub-
Contractor. (3) General Contractor may, at his absolute 
discretion, stop the work at any time, hut where Sub-
Contractor is not in default hereunder, Genera! Contractor 
shall pay Sub-Contractor for all work done in conformity with 
the plan*; and specifications. 
5. LIABILITY 
(a ) G e n e r a l L i a b i l i t y : Sub-Contractor shall 
indemnify and save General Contractor, its officers or agents 
harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, injury, 
liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons, 
and all loc* of or damage to property of others, resulting di-
rectly or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this 
contract. 
(b) Liability for Existing Property: Sub-
Contractor shall be liable to General Contractor for any loss 
of or damage to existing property resulting directly or 
indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this contract 
to the extent of the applicable insurance which Sub-Contractor 
has in force at the time of the occurrence and which shall not 
be los* than the amount provided in Section G hereof. 
(c) Liability for the Work Hereunder. Sub-
Contractor shall exercise due care and diligence in the conduct 
of the work hereunder and in the care and protection of any 
material or equipment furnished by General Contractor to 
Sub-Contractor therefor. Such work, material, or equipment 
Jo«»t or damaged by Ore, storm, or any other cause whatsoever, 
Sub-Contractor shall reconstruct, repair or replace. 
(d) Employer's Liability: Subcontractor shall 
perform the work hereunder in conformance with all 
applicable Federal and State labor laws, and shall indemnify 
and save General Contractor harmless from any and all 
liability, claims, costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature 
under such laws arising out of the performance of this 
contiact 
( e ) L i e n s : Sub-Contractor shall discharge at once or 
shall bond against all liens which may be filed in connection 
with the work performed by Sub-Contractor, and shall save 
the General Contractor and the owners of the premises upon 
which the work is performed harmless therefrom 
(f) A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s : Sub-Contractor shall pay to 
General Contractor a reasonable attorney fee, in any legal 
fiction in which the General Contractor prevails, brought 
against Sub-Contractor based on a breach of this contract 
6. INSURANCE 
Sub-Omtraclnr shall maintain at all times during the 
performance of work hereunder the following insurance in 
companies and on terms satisfactory to General Contractor: 
(1) Workmen's Compensation Insurance, as prescribed or 
permitted by law. (2) Property Damage, Liability Insurance, 
including automobile, covering property of others and property 
of General Contractor other than the work performed under 
this contract, in an amount not less that $1,000,000.00 for 
each occurrence. 
7. ASSIGNMENT 
(a ) A s s i g n m e n t : This agreement shall not be 
assigned, sublet, or transferred in whole or in part by the Sub-
Contractor, except with the previous written consent of the 
General Contractor. 
(b) Assignment by General Contractor: It 
is expressly agreed that General Contractor may assign all of 
its rights and interest hereunder to the owner, and that in 
such event, Sub-Contractor shall continue in its performance 
hereunder as if no assignment had been made. 
8. CONTRACTOR'S UNDERSTANDING 
It is undcrvood and agreed that the Sub-Con tractor, as the 
result of careful examination, is satisfied as to the nature and 
location of the work, the conformation and structure of the 
pronnd, the character, quality, and quantity of the materials 
tu i»e used, the character of equipment and facilities needed 
prchminary to and during the prosecution of the work, the 
g -neral and local conditions, and all other matters which can 
in any way afTcct the work under this contract No 
representations by or oral agreement with any officer, agent, 
or employee of the General Contractor, either before or after 
the execution of this contract, shall afTect or modify any of the 
Sub-Contractor's rights or obligations hereunder. 
It is further understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor 
is bound and will comply with all the terms and conditions of 
the labor agreements to which the General Contractor is a 
party, insofar as said labor agreements lawfully require the 
Sub-Contractor to be so bound. 
SUB-CONT" 
By: 
Date: / ~? S\rf~~S 7 7 * 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR: 
ABP DEVELOPMENT OCWftPANY 
Br-
Date: 
COI: 
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DEC C 5 1990 SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT 
_, , Provo „ ^ _ 23rd 
rHlS AGREEMENT nude at .Uuh.thu _ day of 
October
 l f i 90 ^ ^hrtT<rfn Clark Mechanical Contractors/ Inc. 
Tf ProVQ/ Utah ^ bereinafter referred to as the Contractor, aiul J « B « S h e e t 
Metal/ Inc. 
2487 South 3270 West West Valley City, Utah 84119 
bcreinafur referred to at the Subcontractor, %'t bind ourselves, cur heirs, executors, adminirtraton, successors, and auslgns 
Jointly and aeteraUy firmly by these presents. 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration cf the cotenxnU herein contained, the Contractor and the Subcontractor 
tgrtt as follows: 
1. SCOPE OF WORK 
That the wori to be jytrlonned by the Subcontractor tinder the terms of this agreement consists cf the following: 
Furnishing cf all labor and materia!, tools, implements, and equipment, scaffolding, permits, ttti, etc, to do all of the 
following: Bldg. 19 Specs to apply/ 15000 General/ 15030 System commissioning/ 15042 
Testing/ 15043 Balancing/ (Including I.D. and O&M)/ 15050 Basic Materials and 
Methods/ 15180 Insulation (Ductwrap and breaching)/ 15800 Air distribution. 
Total price (Including tax addenda/ and a l t e r n a t e ) . . . . . $297/903.00 
TC»es the Subcontractor does cot install aU materia! furnished onder this Subcontract such material as is cot installed 
Is to be delivered F.O.B.. Orem J o b s i t e 
3 cT W* .
 % ^ . . .r ,. , . Brower & Associates £} fa strict accordance with the plans and specifications as prepared by — 
C"x ^ Q WordPerfect Bldg. #10 
» ^ Architect and/or Engineer, for the construction cf _ _ _ :— 
C£ 
ToT WordPerfect Corp. O^er, 
for which construction the Contractor bas the prime contract with the Owner; together with all addendi cr authorised 
changes issued prior to the date of execution cf this agreement. 
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agTee to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement, construction 
angulations, general conditions, plans and specifications, and any and all other contract documents, if any there be. Insofar 
JLS applicable to this subcontract agreement, and to that portion of the wora bereio describe]! to be performed by the Subcon-
tractor. 
In tbf event of any doubt or question seising between thf Contractor and the Subcontractor with respect to the plans 
*T*S specification* the decision of the Architect and/or Engineer ahal) b< conclusive and binding Should there be rosuper-
tiiJOf architect orer th( morl, then the mstter In question shell b< determined ai provided In Section 7 of the agreement. 
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OJ any other Subcontractor, and In the event that the Subcontractor oegJecu ano/or *»m *v •»*>>>» wic neceu^ry abor 
and/or materials tools, implement*, equipment, etc., in the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor shall notify the 
Subcontractor in writinf aettinr forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five day* after date of such written notice, the 
Contractor aha!) have the right If he to desire* to take over the work of the Subcontractor fa full, and eielude the Subcon-
tractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at his option the Contractor may lake 
over auch portion of the Subcontractor's work an the Contractor shall dttm to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and 
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work. Whichever method the Contractor might elect 
to pursue the Subcontractor mpeti to release to the Contractor, for bis use only, without recourse, any materials, took, 
implement* equipment, etc., on the aite, belonging to or in the possession of the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the Con-
tractor in completing the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agree* to complete the work to the best of 
his ability and in the most economical manner aTailable to him at the time. Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing 
any tuch portion of the work covered by this agreement ahall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the 
terms of this agreement and in the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall be 
Insufficient to cover the* costs teemed by the Contractor in completing tbe work, then the Subcontractor and his sureties, if 
any, ahall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference. 
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partially 
noon the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcon-
tractors on the project, tbe Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any auch defects and report tame in 
writinrr to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which it to dependent; and ahall allow to the Contractor a reason-
able time In which to remedy tuch defects; and in the event he does not to report to the Contractor in writing, then it ahalJ 
be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and he ahall be fully respon-
sible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, ttgsidltss of the defective work of 
others. 
The Subcontractor shall dean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbish and debris re-
sulting from his work Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall ttrvt as cause for withholding further payment to Sub-
contractor until such time as this condition is corrected to the satisfaction of tbe Contractor. Also he shall dean up to the 
satisfaction of the inspectors, til dirt, frease marks, etc., from walis, ceiling*, floors, fixtures, etc , deposited or placed thereon 
Z a result of the execution of this subcontract If the Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this deanmg as directed by 
the Contractor the Contractor shall have the right and power to proceed with the said cleaning, and the Subcontractor will 
en demand repay to the Contractor tbe actual cost of said labor plus a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover super-
vision, insurance, overhead, etc. 
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against 
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to 
fumkh the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for 
herein and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may 
roufn by "ason of such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shall not release the Subcontractor 
from his obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract 
Whenever it may be weful or necessary to the Contractor to do to, the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or 
sue any portion of the work which has been cither partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection 
and accentance thereof by the Owner, but such use and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of 
Lid work and materials nor of his obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which 
« y occur or develop prior to Contractor', release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, however the Subcontractor 
shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor, 
nor for any damage thereto that is due to or caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor during auch period of use. 
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until completion and final acceptance^of 
the Contact by the Owner, and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such acceptance and shall pay promptly for 
all materials and labor furnished to iht project In the event of Joss or damage, he shall proceed prompt^ to make repairs, or 
replacement of the damaged work, property and/or materials at bis own expert, as directed by the Contractor. Subcon-
tractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor s work, 
property or materials. 
It is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying 
whenever a petition in Bankruptcy or for the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him. 
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes 
toward the Owner The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor tnd the Owner tgainsl^tnd save them harmless from, 
any and til loss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys* fees incurred or suffered on account of tny breach of the provisions 
or covenants of this contract 
*pt 
the subcontract* failure to comply. 
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4. PERMITS. LICENSES, FEES, TAXES. ETC, 
The Subcontractor shall, at his own cost and expense, apply for and obtain all necessary permits and licenses and shall 
.conform strictly to the laws and ordinances in force in the locality where the work under the project is being done, insofar 
as applicable to work covered by this agreement. The Subcontractor shall hold harmless the prime Contractor against liability 
by reason of the Subcontractor having failed to pay federal, state, county or municipal taxes. 
5. ^MS&m&r 
The Subcontractor agrees to provide and maintain workmen's compensation insurance and to comply in all respects 
with the employment and payment of labor, required by amy constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the area in 
which the work is performed. 
The Subcontractor agrees to carry comprehensive public liability and property damage insurance, and such other 
insurance Mi the Contractor might deem necessary, in amounts as approved by the Contractor, in order to protect the Con-
tractor and Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts of the Subcontractor, bis agents, and/or employees. Such 
Insurance shall cot be less than limits and coverages required in the general contract documents. 
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, of such insurance, including copies of the 
policies, when requested to do so by the Contractor. 
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory 
to Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractor's expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance 
being supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be 
notified by ten (10) days9 written notice before cancellation of any such policy. In event of threatened cancellation for non-
payment of premium, Contractor may pay same for Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or sub-
sequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder. 
6. CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 
The Contractor may add to or deduct from the amount of work covered by ibis agreement, and any changes made in 
the amount of work involved, or any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in 
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Sub-
contractor if such be possible; and if such mutual agreement is not passible, then the value of the work shall be determined as 
provided in Section 7 of this agreement. .In either event, however, the Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as 
changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not to delay the progress of the work, and pending any determi-
nation of the value thereof. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional worlc outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof 
shall be conclusive witb respect of this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall be made within one 
week from date of completion. 
The Subcontractor shall net sublet, transfer or assign this agreement or any fuses due Or to become due or any part 
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor. 
7. -DISPUTES 
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute 
shall be settled in the manner provided by the contract documenU. If none be provided, or if there arises any dispute con-
cerning matters to connection with this agreement, and without the scope of the work, then such disputes shall be settled by 
a ruling of a board of arbitration consisting of three members, one selected by the Contractor, one by the Subcontractor and 
the third member shall be selected by the first two members. The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of 
their selected members respectively, but the expenses of the third member shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the 
arbitration in writing. 
The Contractor and Subcontractor M^ree to be bound by the findings of any such boards of arbitration, finally ^n<5 
without recourse to any court of law. 
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in monthly peymeDti of ±^ *> oi the work performed in *uy F t t n i . u < ^v«uu, »** -wWi«*^« n iM1 esximat« 
prepared by the Subcontractor and Si approved by the Contractor «"* A r c h i t e c t /Owner 
; auch payments to be made as payments are recerrcd by the Contractor from the Ovmt 
covering the monthly estimates of the Contractor, Including the tpproved portion of the Subcontractor's monthly estimate 
In the event the Subcontractor Coet not submit to the Contractor such monthly estimatei prior to the dzte of aubmis-
aion of the Contractor's monthly estimate, then the Contractor ahall include in his monthly estimate to the Owner for work 
performed during the preceding month aticb amount as he shall deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the pre-
ceding month and the Subcontractor arrees to accept sucu approved portion thereof as his regular monthly payment as 
described above. 
The Subcontractor agree* to cuke food without cost to th+ Owner or Contractor any and iH defects due to faulty 
workmanship and/or materials which may *ppe*r within the period *o established in the contract documents; and if no auch 
period be stipulated in the contract documents, then auch guarantee shaU be for a period of one year from date of completion 
of the project. The Subcontractor further agrees to execute any apecial guarantees as provided by terms of the Contract 
documents, prior to final payment. 
In the event It appears to the Contractor that the labor, material and other bills incurred in the performance of the 
work are not being currently paid, the Contractor may take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that the 
money paid with any progrtu payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor, material and all other bills 
incurred in the performance of the work of Subcontractor. The Contractor may deduct from any amounts due or to become 
due to the Subcontractor any gum or turns owing by the Subcontractor to the Contractor; and in the event of any breach by 
the Subcontractor of any prorislon or obligation of this Subcontract, or in the event of the assertion by other parties of any 
clnittt «w lien »jjnin*t tlx* Contractor or Contractor'* Surety or the premise* nrUinj: out of the Subcontractor'* performance of 
this Contract, the Contractor ahall hare the right, but is not required, to retain out of any payments due or to become due to 
the Subcontractor an amount tufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss, damage or expense there-
from, until the situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the satisfaction of the Contractor. These 
provisions shall be applicable even though the subcontractor has posted a full payment and performance bond. 
9. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT 
In the event the prime contract between the Owner and the Contractor should be terminated prior to its completion, 
then the Contractor and Subcontractor agree that an equitable settlement for work performed under thlz agreement prior to 
6uc!i termination, wUi be m*dt as provided by the contract documents, if such provision be made; or, if none such exist, next 
by mutual agreement; or, falling either of these methods, by arbitration as provided in Section 7« 
10. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
During the performance of this subcontract, the Subcontractor agrees to not discriminate against any employee because 
of race, color, creed or national origin. As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order 
10925 of March 6,1961 as amended by Executive Order 11246 of September 24,1965. The executive orders and the respec-
tive regulations are made a part of this subcontract by reference. 
11. TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS 
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract, the Subcontractor is bound and 
-will comply with the terms and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor h a party, insofar as said 
iabor agreements lawfully require subcontractors td^be so bound. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms 
hereof by affixing their signatures hereunto. 
WITNESS: 
Clark Mechanical contractors/ Inc. 
717 Columbia Lane 
<Addre«) Stephen JJ. ciarx 
Provo, Utah 84604 
By 
J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. 
(Subcontractor; 
2487 South 3270 West ^^t.^ldVO., A „, , , hi. 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
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Clark Mochonlca! Conffoclors, Inc. 
Itiis statement i s attached and made a part of the Clark Mechanical Cont-
ractors/ Inc. Subcontract Agreement: 
f32) Hie federally assisted construction contractor certif ies that he does 
Jot Maintain or provide for his employees any s e d a t e d f a c i l i t i e s a t any 
of Ms establishments, end that he does not permit his employees to perform 
their services at any location, under his control, where segregated f a c i l i t i e s 
*re contained. The federally assisted construction contractor c e r t i f i e s 
further that he wil l rot maintain or provide for his employees any segregated 
faci l i t ies at any of his establishments, and that he will rot permit h i s 
employees to perform their services at any location, tinder h.s control, where 
s e d a t e d fac i l i t i e s are maintained. The federally assisted construction 
contractor agrees that a breach of this certification i s a violation of the 
Equal Opportunity clause in this contract. As used in this cer t i f i ca t ion , 
the term "segregated f a c i l i t i e s " means any waiting rooms, work areas, r e s t 
rooms and wash rooms, restaurants and other eating areas time clocks locker 
rooms and other storage or dressing areas, parking lots , drinking J«™tains . 
recreation or entertainment areas, transportation, end-housing f a c i l i t i e s pro-
vided for employees which are segregated by explicit directive or are i n fac t 
segregated on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, because of 
L b i t ! local custom, or other reason. The federally assisted construction 
Contractor agrees that (except vhere he has obtained identical cer t i f i ca t ions 
xrom proposed contractors fo? specific time periods) he-will obtain j f e n t i c a l 
certifications from proposed subcontractors prior to the award of ™ b c o n * ™ £ * 
exceeding $10,000 which are tiot exempt from the provisions of the Equal Opportune 
clause, end that he wil l retain such certifications in his f i l e s . 
JO-23-40 
Signar>"-P D^te 
Stephen D. Clark President 
Karoe and Title of Signer (Please type) 
fUTE: the penalty for making false statements in offers i s prescribed 
in 18 V. S. C. 1001 
/ n o : 218 
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To be added to Parag* 10 "Equal Employment o, ortunity* 
Clark Mechanical Contractors^ Inc. i s a non-exeirpt federal contractor 
and i s subject to the following regulations: 41 CFR 60-1.4 (a) (7)# 
41 CFR 60-250.4 (m),( and 41 CFR 60-741.4(f). 
Statement of Certification on Konsegregated Faci l i t i es (See Attachment.) 
Also a part of this subcontract. 
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^ ^ ^ . c ^ s t n c ! Court 
CAR^^ MITH? i l l? 
Robert R. Wallace, #3366 
John N. Braithwaite, #4544 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
DecuK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and A.B.P. 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, dba ABP 
Development Company, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene 
Peterson Concrete, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910400292PI 
Judge Harding 
The following motions have been received and have been 
submitted for decision by the Court in this action: 
?353 
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1. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc•; 
2. Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgement; 
3. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal; 
4. J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment; 
5. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff; and 
6. Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing. 
The Court/ having reviewed each of the foregoing 
motions, the memoranda filed in support thereof and in opposition 
thereto by the parties, having reviewed the relevant law, being 
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS that A.B.P. Enterprises' (-A.B.P. H) Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. ("Clark") is denied, and Clark's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P.'s claim for indemnity 
is granted. The Court finds that the indemnity provisions of the 
contract between A.B.P. and Clark make reference to liability that 
may arise from Clark's performance of the contract, but cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal is 
denied. There is no contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. 
Sheet Metal, and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions of 
the contract between Clark and J.B. Sheet Metal. The Court 
further finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that J.B. 
Sheet Metal indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff are granted in part and denied in part 
as follows: 
1. Consistent with the Court's prior ruling on 
Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment, summary judgment is granted 
in favor of J.B. Sheet Metal and A.B.P. and against plaintiff on 
plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action. The Court rules that 
plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is invalid to the extent that it 
is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract 
between A.B.P. and Clark or the contract between Clark and J.B. 
Sheet Metal. The plaintiff was not an intended third-party 
beneficiary of either of the contracts. Although the contracts 
provide generally for the implementation of safety measures, the 
terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the 
2 0 5 0 
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plaintiff. Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the 
contractual obligations of the parties would clearly have been 
incidental. 
2. The Court further grants summary judgment in favor 
of all the defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's Second 
and Third Causes of Action to the extent that the plaintiff 
alleges the Second and Third Causes of Action as independent 
causes of action. The Court finds that no independent action 
exists for the breach of OSHA standards. Evidence of OSHA 
violations may not be the basis of an independent cause of action, 
but may be permitted only as evidence of negligence. However, the 
Court does not dismiss plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of 
Action. They are not alternate causes of action, but rather 
alternate bases upon which negligence may be found. 
3. With regard to all the motions for summary judgment 
on plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, the Court finds that the 
facts involved in this action do not appear to be legally 
sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of an inherently dangerous 
condition. However, the Court reserves its ruling on this issue 
until all of the evidence has been introduced at trial. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for 
Rehearing, filed January 22, 1993, is denied. The Court finds no 
need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed 
of in its prior ruling. 
*i J J 0 
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DATED t h i s / day of /tS/<X^>A* » , 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for A.B.P* 
Enterprises 
GLENN C. HANNg? 
Attorney for Clark 
Mechanical 
LYNN C. HARRIS 
Attorney for plaintiff 
Richard HeaJ 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Gene 
Peterson Concrete 
jSOHK 
Attorney for J.B. 
Sheet Metal 
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Robert R. Wallace, #3366 
John N. Braithwaite, #4544 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Fourth J u d l C l a ! D ; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
J . B . SHEET METAL, I N C . , a 
U t a h c o r p o r a t i o n , and A . B . P . 
ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a Utah 
c o r p o r a t i o n , dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, I N C . , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
A . B . P . ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a 
U t a h C o r p o r a t i o n , dba ABP 
D e v e l o p m e n t Company, 
T h i r d - P a r t y 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene 
Peterson Concrete, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910400292PI 
Judge Harding 
The court, having reviewed and fully considered J.B. 
Sheet Metal, Inch's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P. 
$ - 7 4 
E n t e r p r i s e s 7 C r o s s - C l a i m A g a i n s t J . B . S h e e t M e t a l , I n c . , t o g e t h e r x 
E x h i b i t E 
with both supporting and opposing memoranda, and having previously 
ruled on these issues as raised by A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet 
Metal, being fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause 
therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that J.B. Sheet 
Metal, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P.'s Cross-
Claim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. is granted. There is no 
contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., and 
A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an intended third-party 
beneficiary of the indemnity provisions of the contract between 
Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. The 
Court further finds that the indemnity provisions cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P. 's own 
negligence. 
DATED this / 3 day o 
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Robert R. Wallace, #3366 
John N. Braithwaite, #4544 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and A.B.P. 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Utah Corporation, dba ABP 
Development Company, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene 
Peterson Concrete, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910400292PI 
Judge Harding 
The court, having reviewed and fully considered Clark 
Mechanical's motion for judgment on its cross-claim against J.B. 
Sheet Metal, and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.'s cross motion for summary ^  
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0 
judgment on Clark Mechanical's cross-claim against J.B. Sheet 
Metal,Inc., together with both supporting and opposing memoranda, 
and having previously ruled on these issues as raised by A.B.P. 
Enterprise's motion for partial summary judgment on issues of 
indemnity against Clark Mechanical and J.B. Sheet Metal, being 
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. That J.B. Sheet Metal Inc.'s cross motion for 
summary judgment on Clark Mechanical's cross-claim against J.B. 
Sheet Metal, Inc. is granted. The Court finds that the indemnity 
provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any 
intent of the parties that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. indemnify Clark 
Mechanical for Clark Mechanical's own negligence or for A.B.P. 
Enterprise's own negligence. Clark Mechanical's cross-claim 
against J.B. Sheet Metal is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Clark Mechanical's motion for summary judgment 
against J.B. Sheet Metal is hereby denied. 
DATED this /ft day of /&£^ 1993. 
BY TH^ TcblJRT 
h District Court J 
^ o. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI 
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON dba GENE 
PETERSON CONCRETE 
Third-Party 
Defendant 
The Court has received and fully considered the following motions now pending in 
this case: 
1. A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
ireo 
E x h i b i t G 
Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical Contractors Inc. 
2 Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement. 
3. A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal. 
4. J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement. 
5. A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement Against Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing. 
The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above and accordingly grants 
Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of indemnity. Based upon its interpretation of 
the relevant terms of the contract between A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the 
indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause 
clearly makes reference to liability that may arise from the subcontractor's performance. 
Their is no similar reference to possible liability arising from the contractor's actions. 
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above on similar 
grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However, no contractual privity 
exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between Clark and J B. Sheet 
Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event. 
With regard to the fourth and fifth motions enumerated above, the Court grants the 
motions in part and denies them in part. Consistent with the Court' s prior ruling on Clark's 
motion for summary judgement, the court rules that plaintiffs "Fifth Cause of Action" is 
invalid to the extent that it is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract 
between A.B.P. Enterprises and Clark Mechanical or the contract between Clark Mechanical 
and J.B. Sheet Metal. Based upon its interpretation of the contracts, the Court rules as a 
matter of law that plaintiff was not an intended third-party beneficiary of such contracts. See 
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Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981); and Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). Although the contracts provide generally 
for the implementation of safety measures, the terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the plaintiff in this case. 
Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the parties' contractual obligations of safety would 
clearly have been incidental. 
The Court further grants defendants' motions for summary judgement against plaintiff 
to the extent that plaintiff may be attempting to assert his second and third claims (involving 
alleged OSHA violations) as independent causes of action. The Court must agree with 
defendants that no independent action exists for the breach of OSHA standards. 
However, the Court denies the fourth and fifth motion enumerated above to the extent 
that defendant's seek to have plaintiffs second and third claims dismissed. In order to 
avoid procedural or formal difficulties that may arise, the Court will not dismiss plaintiffs 
second and third causes of action. The Court notes that while OSHA violations may not be 
the basis for an independent cause of action, evidence of such violations may be permitted as 
evidence of negligence (i.e. evidence of the relevant standard of care and the possible breach 
thereof). Accordingly, plaintiffs second and third causes are not to be regarded as alternate 
causes of action but rather alternate bases upon which negligence may be found. 
The Court is inclined to grant defendants' motions for summary judgement with 
regard to plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action on the basis that the facts involved in this case 
doe not appear to be legally sufficient to support plaintiffs claim of an "inherently dangerous 
condition." However, the Court will reserve its ruling on this issue until all the evidence has 
been introduced at trial. 
E x h i b i t G 
Finally, finding no need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed of 
in its prior ruling in this case, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing, filed 
January 22, 1993. 
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 10th day of February, 1993. 
B] 
cc: Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Edward P. Moriarity, Esq. 
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Glenn C. Hanoi, Esq. 
John N. Braithwaite, Esq. 
1 . J. i 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI 
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON dba GENE 
PETERSON CONCRETE 
Third-Party 
Defendant 
The Court has received and fully considered J.B. Sheet Metal's Cross-Motion for 
9>* 
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Summary Judgement on A.B.P's Cross-Claim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, together with both 
supporting and opposing memoranda. In its February 10, 1993 memorandum decision, the 
court ruled as follows: 
The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above [A.B.P. Enterprise's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical 
Contractors Inc.] and accordingly grants Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of 
indemnity. Based upon its interpretation of the relevant terms of the contract between 
A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P. 's 
own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause clearly makes reference to liability that 
may arise from the subcontractor's performance. Their is no similar reference to possible 
liability arising from the contractor's actions. 
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above [A.B.P. 
Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. 
Sheet Metal.] on similar grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However, 
no contractual privity exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to 
establish that it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between 
Clark and J. B. Sheet Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event. 
Upon finding no evidence of contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet 
Metal, and upon denying A.B.P. 's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal," the Court has already implicitly ruled on all issues 
necessary to the disposition of J.B. Sheet Metal's pending motion. Accordingly, the Court 
hereby grants the motion, finding that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding 
A.B.P.'s cross-claim for indemnity against J.B. Sheet Metal and that J.B. Sheet Metal is 
entitled to judgement on the issue as a matter of law. 
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
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Dated this ^/xtfrdav of June, 1993. 
BYT 
ING, JUDG^ 
cc: Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Edward P. Moriarity, Esq. 
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
John N. Braithwaite, Esq. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 910400292 PI 
DATE: October 4 , 1993 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Joe Morton 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling on Clark Mechanical's motion for 
Judgement on Its Cross-Claim against J.B. Sheet Metal, and J.B. Sheet Metal's Cross Motion 
for Summary Judgement on Clark Mechanical's Cross-Claim for Indemnity. Having 
received and considered both motions, together with memoranda both in support and in 
opposition to the motion, the Court hereby enters judgement and grants J.B. Sheet Metal's 
Motion for Summary Judgement. As indicated in earlier memoranda, the Court finds that 
the contractual language does not require J.B. Sheet Metal to indemnify Clark Mechanical or 
A.B.P. Enterprise for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
Counsel for J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
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Dated this 4th day of October, 1993. 
/ 
HARDING, JUDGI 
/ 
cc: Brent D.Young, Esq.\^ *£\ 
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. v 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq"' 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Robert R. Wallace, Esq. 
Paul S. Felt, Esq. 
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